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The abilities to either flexibly adjust behavior according to changing demands (cognitive
flexibility) or to maintain it in the face of potential distractors (cognitive stability) are
critical for adaptive behavior in many situations. Recently, a novel human paradigm has
found individual differences of cognitive flexibility and stability to be related to common
prefrontal networks. The aims of the present study were, first, to translate this paradigm
from humans to mice and, second, to test conceptual predictions of a computational
model of prefrontal working memory mechanisms, the Dual State Theory, which assumes
an antagonistic relation between cognitive flexibility and stability. Mice were trained in a
touchscreen-paradigm to discriminate visual cues. The task involved “ongoing” and cued
“switch” trials. In addition distractor cues were interspersed to test the ability to resist
distraction, and an ambiguous condition assessed the spontaneous switching between
two possible responses without explicit cues. While response times did not differ
substantially between conditions, error rates (ER) increased from the “ongoing” baseline
condition to the most complex condition, where subjects were required to switch between
two responses in the presence of a distracting cue. Importantly, subjects switching more
often spontaneously were found to be more distractible by task irrelevant cues, but
also more flexible in situations, where switching was required. These results support
a dichotomy of cognitive flexibility and stability as predicted by the Dual State Theory.
Furthermore, they replicate critical aspects of the human paradigm, which indicates the
translational potential of the testing procedure and supports the use of touchscreen
procedures in preclinical animal research.
Keywords: cognitive flexibility, cognitive stability, touchscreen chambers, translation, mice, Dual State Theory,
neurocomputational models, executive functioning
INTRODUCTION
The abilities to either flexibly adjust behavior according to
changing environmental demands (cognitive flexibility) or to
maintain it in the face of potential distractors (cognitive sta-
bility) form an important component of executive function-
ing (Diamond, 2013). Along with other higher-level cognitive
skills, these abilities are crucial for our daily life when multi-
ple behavioral options exist and demands are shifting (Banich,
2009). Deficits in these cognitive domains, however, are observed
among patients suffering from psychiatric diseases (Dirnberger
and Jahanshahi, 2013; Etkin et al., 2013; Snyder, 2013). Especially
in schizophrenic patients, impairments in executive processing in
general and in task switching or cognitive flexibility in particular
have been reported (Wylie et al., 2010; Orellana and Slachevsky,
2013; Schirmbeck et al., 2013). Interestingly, impairments in the
domains of higher-order cognitive functions are also found in
non-affected family members of schizophrenic patients, indicat-
ing the presence of a genetic predisposition (Heydebrand, 2006;
Snitz et al., 2006). Therefore, deficits in executive functioningmay
be considered core features of the disease that may even provide
the basis on which other symptoms may occur (Barch, 2005; Beck
and Rector, 2005).
From a neural perspective, these higher-level cognitive pro-
cesses are supposed to involve various brain structures, most
prominently the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the mesocortical
dopamine (DA) system (Goldman-Rakic et al., 2000; Winterer
and Weinberger, 2004; Klanker et al., 2013). In line with these
findings, both cognitive flexibility and cognitive stability have
been related to PFC functioning (Curtis and D’Esposito, 2003;
Floresco et al., 2009; Stelzel et al., 2010, 2013; Toepper et al., 2010;
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Kesner and Churchwell, 2011), but it is still not clear whether they
depend upon separate or concordant neural networks. Therefore,
a theoretical framework has been developed through a biophysi-
cally realistic computational model of the PFC-DA network that
aims to identify mechanisms underlying cognitive flexibility and
stability (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008). According to this Dual
State Theory, cognitive stability and cognitive flexibility are reg-
ulated by differential activity of the dopaminergic subsystems
(D1-receptor-class vs. D2-receptor-class, respectively) in the PFC,
possibly relying on differences in either receptor densities, base-
line neurotransmitter levels, or the efficiency of neurotransmitter
clearance (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2002, 2008; Bilder et al.,
2004; Thurley et al., 2008). Specifically, simulation results led to
the proposal of two distinct regimes, termed the D1-state and the
D2-state, which either result in stable memory representations or
flexible switching among representations, respectively. While in a
D1-dominated state representations are characterized by a high
energy barrier among different system states, resulting in repre-
sentations that are robust to distraction (= cognitive stability), a
D2-state results in low energy barriers between states, allowing
for switching between representations (= cognitive flexibility).
From a neurocomputational perspective, it can thus be derived
that the degree of cognitive flexibility varies between persons due
to, for example genetic differences in network properties or neu-
rotransmitter levels, and that cognitive flexibility and stability are
antagonistically related and controlled by a common neuronal
network. Empirical data seem to support these predictions, in
that working memory maintenance has been reliably associated
with D1 mediated PFC activity (Goldman-Rakic et al., 2000) and
some of our ownwork has shown thatmodulation of D2 signaling
either genetically Stelzel et al.(2010) or pharmacologically Stelzel
et al.(2013) affects the efficiency of cognitive flexibility.
To systematically investigate the predictions made by the Dual
State Theory, a novel task paradigm has recently been established
in a healthy human population, which requires in the same task
either cognitive flexibility or cognitive stability (Armbruster et al.,
2012; Figure 1). Participants had to respond by button press to
digits between 1 and 9. In most of the trials, only one digit
was presented above a fixation cross and subjects had to decide
whether this digit was odd or even (= rule 1). For the remain-
ing 20% of trials, two digits were presented on the screen (above
and below the fixation cross). If the upper digit was brighter
than the lower digit, the participants had to continue using rule
1 and ignore the second distracting digit. By contrast, if the
lower digit was brighter than the upper digit, subjects had to
switch the rules and decide whether the lower digit was smaller or
larger than 5 (= rule 2). Finally, in an ambiguous condition, the
grayscale values of the two digits were indistinguishable, allow-
ing for assessing the individual rate of spontaneous switching in
the absence of explicit external cues, as a measure of individ-
ual differences in cognitive flexibility (Armbruster et al., 2012).
Participants were found to differ substantially in the individual
spontaneous switching rate, and more flexible persons were more
efficient in task switching but also more distractible during dis-
tractor inhibition. These results support the dimensional model
of cognitive flexibility and stability described by the Dual State
Theory (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008).
However, not all predictions of computational models can
be adequately addressed in human subjects. Translational
approaches are necessary to understand cellular and molecu-
lar mechanisms and identify new treatment options (Van Der
Worp and Sandercock, 2012; Homberg, 2013). A high failure rate
of preclinically identified compounds in the clinical trials (Kola
and Landis, 2004) underscores the importance of reliability and
validity of animal models as a premise to draw meaningful trans-
lational conclusions from preclinical findings. Some biomedical
research efforts therefore now aim at translating clinical findings
back to measures in animal disease models (e.g., Garner et al.,
2006).
Therefore, the aim of the present study was to introduce a
mouse paradigm to assess cognitive flexibility vs. cognitive sta-
bility in close analogy to the human paradigm using cues and
outcomemeasures of the same qualities (Armbruster et al., 2012).
In contrast to already established set-shifting procedures in mice
(Garner et al., 2006; Endo et al., 2011; Bissonette and Powell,
2012; Scheggia et al., 2014), the strength of the present approach is
twofold: First, it has a high translational value as it is derived from
a behavioral paradigm for humans, and second, it is conceptually
based on a biophysically plausible neurocomputational theory
that has the potential of linking animal and human behavior
across species.
In analogy to the human paradigm, we assessed within one
paradigm the individual’s task performance in the presence
of irrelevant distractor cues and the flexibility required when
responding to switching cues, as well as the individual’s dispo-
sition to spontaneously switch in response to ambiguous stimuli.
According to the dimensional model of Durstewitz and Seamans
(2008) and in line with the human data, we expected to find
opposing trends in behavior among individuals: More flexible
subjects with a greater tendency toward switching in an ambigu-
ous situation were thus expected to switch faster and more accu-
rately when explicitly cued, while at the same time being more
prone to distraction. By contrast, more stable subjects charac-
terized by less spontaneous switching behavior were expected to
resist distraction more efficiently, while at the same time making
more errors when cognitive flexibility (i.e., switching) is explicitly
required.
In sum, the present study aims at translating a human stability-
flexibility paradigm to mice. Via comparison of behavioral results
from mice to those previously derived from humans, we both
validate the animal paradigm and at the same time provide
supportive evidence for the Dual State Theory from a different
species, i.e., mice.
ANIMALS, MATERIALS, AND METHODS
ANIMALS
The subjects were 24 male C57BL/6N mice (Charles River,
Sulzfeld, Germany), approximately 13 weeks old at the onset of
the experimental procedure. Mice were single-housed in conven-
tional macrolon cages (Type II, 26 × 20 × 14 cm) with sawdust
(Rehofix MK-2000; Rettenmaier & Söhne, Rosenberg, Germany),
nesting material, and tap water ad libitum. Upon arrival all ani-
mals were earmarked with individual patterns to allow precise
identification of the individual mouse. Once per week, the cages
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FIGURE 1 | The human STABFLEX test.With permission from: Armbruster
et al. (2012). Most of the trials required a response by button press to only one
(upper) digit decidingwether it is odd or even. In 20% of the trials a second digit
appeared below the fixation cross. Subjects had to ignore this digit if its color
was darker than the upper one. If the lower digit was brighter however, subjects
had to switch to the bottom digit and respond according to a different rule, i.e.,
>/<5 with the respective other hand (left and right hand counterbalanced
between subjects). In ambiguous trials, brightness differences between stimuli
were not detectable, and participantswere free to switch or stay. This condition
served to assess the individual spontaneous switching rate.
were cleaned, water bottles replaced, and new tissue paper pro-
vided. The colony room was maintained at a temperature of
23 ± 2◦C, a relative humidity of 50 ± 5% and a reversed 12 h
light-dark schedule with the lights off at 7 am.
Prior to testing, ad libitum feeding weights were obtained, and
mice were food-restricted to 85–90% of their initially measured
individual bodyweight. To maintain the animals in a healthy state
and to adjust the daily amount of food individually, the weight
and health status of each mouse was checked on a daily basis.
Food restriction, however, did not cause any observable changes
in the animals’ behavior.
All experiments complied with the regulations covering animal
experimentation within the EU (European Communities Council
Directive 2010/63/EU) and were approved by German animal
welfare authorities (Regierungspräsidium Karlsruhe). Moreover,
all efforts were made to minimize the number of animals used
and the severity of procedures applied in the study.
TEST
Apparatus
All animals were tested in Campden Instruments Ltd.
(Loughborough, Leics., UK) mouse touchscreen chambers
(Model 80614-20). The chambers were equipped with a 3-W
house light, a tone generator and several light beams detecting the
movement of the mouse. The trapezoid shaped inner chamber
(h 19 cm, w 24 respectively 6 cm, d 17 cm) consisted of black
Perspex walls and a metal grid floor. At one end, the boxes were
equipped with screens surrounded by infra-red detectors to
sense touches. As a consequence, the mice were not required to
get in direct contact with the screen, but needed to approach
the stimuli closely by nose-poke responses. The screens were
partly covered by a Perspex mask in order to block access to
the display except through three equal response windows that
measured 7 × 7 cm each (Figure 2). Each window was separated
by black Perspex dividers to prevent accidental approaches to
the adjacent response window. During the training and testing
procedure the outer fields were used to detect touches (left and
right touch fields), whereas the center field was used to present
cues (cue presentation field) (Figure 2). A food well (2 × 2×
2 cm3) attached to an externally placed feeder (liquid suspensor)
was located centrally at the rear of the chamber. A panel light
illuminated the food tray and head entries were detected via a
light beam detector. Here, mice were also trained to initiate a trial
by breaking the light beam.
Procedure
Using touchscreen chambers, we translated the above described
human paradigm (Armbruster et al., 2012) as analogously as pos-
sible to the mouse condition. In brief, the mouse-translation of
the human paradigm involved side rather than task switches,
with repetition trials (“ongoing”) occurring with equal likeli-
hood on both sides. A central field was used for the illustration
of a reward-indicating cue that could be presented in three dif-
ferent gray intensities in two different positions. According to
the position of the cue, the mouse had to touch either on the
left or the right touch field to get a reward. In some trials,
two cues of different gray intensity were presented simultane-
ously. In these trials, the animal had to solve the task accord-
ing to the brighter cue, thus ignoring the second distracting
cue. In an ambiguous condition two cues of the same gray
intensity were presented and the mouse could choose freely
between the responses. Thus, taking species-specific differences
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FIGURE 2 | Organization of the cue-presenting and touch-sensitive
fields. The touchscreen was covered by a black Perspex mask with three
equal response windows. While the central field served as the cue
presentation field, the external fields were used as touch fields during
training and testing. For the performance of the “cue-position task,” a
reward-indicating cue was presented either in the top or bottom position of
the central cue presentation field and the mouse had to respond by
touching either on the left or right cross in the touch fields (position-to-side
assignment balanced across subjects). Dependent on the test condition a
distractor of a different gray value could be displayed simultaneously to the
reward-indicating cue in the central cue presentation field.
into account, we modified the test with respect to five key
points:
1. Humans can be instructed and tested in a single session on 1
day, while rodents need to learn various preparatory tasks in
an extensive training, before being capable of managing the
final test. Thus, the time needed to complete the testing is far
greater in the murine than in the human test version.
2. To guarantee a high degree of motivation throughout test-
ing, a rodent test version inevitably relies on a reward-based
structure. Thus, rewarding correct behavior and punishing
incorrect answers are fundamental strategies in the mouse test
version. Moreover, animals need to be food restricted prior to
and during the testing to set up the conditions for testing.
3. In the human paradigm, subjects are asked to respond to a
visual task by pushing a button with one of four possible
fingers (i.e., two fingers per task), while mice have to make
a choice by responding directly to the touch-sensitive screen
via nose-pokes. Because of the different locations of the touch
fields this behavioral response contains a larger motoric com-
ponent that may influence the output measures (e.g., response
times).
4. While the human task required the subject to switch between
two different rules depending on the position of a cue (cue
above the fixation cross > rule 1, cue below the fixation cross
> rule 2), the mouse task relied on a simpler discriminative
task (Is the cue in position one or two? > touch left or right).
Because only the change between two different rules within
one test is conventionally considered to be a “task switch”
(Brigman et al., 2005; Garner et al., 2006), the mouse test
version did not include a “task switch” by definition.
However, as the aim of the present work was to investigate the
antagonistic nature of cognitive flexibility vs. cognitive stabil-
ity according to the Dual State Theory (and not task switching
per se) a task switch was not necessarily required. As cue-
guided switching of response position within one task may in
itself be a demanding challenge on the cognitive systems of a
mouse, we replaced the human task switching aspect of the
paradigm by the requirement of flexible or stable responses
to a discriminative task. Therefore, the procedure was simpli-
fied to increase efficacy and practicability in a mouse model
without compromising specificity.
5. Since the human paradigm included fMRI imaging in the
experimental setup, it was necessary to determine a baseline
state from which differences due to behavioral responses could
be monitored. The baseline task (= responding to a digit
shown in the “upper” position) was presented in 80% of all
cases in order to maintain the brain in a steady state. In 20%
of the cases a second digit was presented simultaneously in
the “bottom” position to allow for assessing brain activation
changes under theoretically interesting conditions, i.e., stress-
ing either cognitive flexibility or stability or, in the ambiguous
condition, providing no clear cues. An exact translation of this
paradigm to the mouse paradigm, however, would have led
to a repeated presentation of one cue in the same position,
requiring the mouse to respond in always the same way. Thus,
to avoid the risk of activating a side bias, animals were trained
to both cue positions equally.
The mice were housed under stable conditions for 4 weeks before
the onset of testing. The testing procedure was divided into three
main phases: habituation, training and testing phase (Figure 3).
The daily testing order followed a fixed schedule to guarantee a
consistent level of motivation due to feeding times. At the begin-
ning of each test session, mice were transported to the test room
in their home cages and allowed to acclimatize to the room before
testing commenced. The testing was done during the dark phase
of the cycle, 2 h after the light change. Food was supplied indi-
vidually following the testing procedure. Inner chambers were
cleaned after the testing of each animal with water. One week
ahead the first introduction into the boxes, the animals received
sweet condensed milk (SCM) in their home cages in order to
avoid later refusal of the reward provided in the touchscreen
boxes.
Habituation. During the habituation phase the mice learned
basic procedures inside the box, such as touching on the screen,
getting a reward, or initiating the next trial (Figure 3). Because
the procedures have been described in detail elsewhere (see
Talpos et al., 2009), we limit the following description to a brief
overview: First, subjects were habituated to the boxes once a
day with increasing duration (10–40min) on three consecutive
days. During the second session, a liquid reward (7µl SCM
“Milchmädchen,” diluted 1:4 in tap water) was placed in the food
well that was freely accessible to the subjects. In the third session,
mice learned to associate the supply of the reward with the illu-
mination of the food well-light and the presentation of a tone.
Following this, they became acquainted with symbols presented
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FIGURE 3 | Experimental timeschedule.The testingprocedurewasdivided into threemain phases: habituation, training and testingphase.During thehabituation
and training phases,micewere acquaintedwith the basic box functions and learned to respond to the discriminative task before being tested in the STABFLEX test.
on the touch fields and learned to nose-poke them to receive a
reward. In the next habituation step the animals learned to initi-
ate each trial by breaking a light beam within the feeder well to
produce the stimulus onset. A correct nose-poke to the response
screen was followed by the disappearance of the stimuli, presen-
tation of a tone and delivery of the reward. Initiation of the next
trial could then occur after a 5 s inter trial interval (ITI). Finally,
punishment of incorrect answers was introduced in form of a 5 s
timeout with house light illumination before the start of the ITI.
Training. In the training the animals were required to learn a rule
of the type “if cue on cue presentation field in position A then
go left, if cue on cue presentation field position B then go right”
(Figure 3). The position-interpretation was consequently coun-
terbalanced across animals. The training was subdivided into four
phases which build on each other introducing single items of the
final task needed in the testing. The position-sequence was deter-
mined pseudo-randomly based on phase-dependent variations of
probability of occurrence.
Phase 1 was named “TWO CROSSES, NO CUE”: A nose-poke to
crosses presented on touch fields was rewarded with a tone, feeder
light and a liquid reward. Touches on the cue presentation field did
not lead to any reaction of the system. The criterion to progress
into the next phase was performance of 30 trials in 30min. In the
second phase “CUE-POSITION TASK” a cue on the cue presenta-
tion field in either top or bottom position indicated which side
was counted “correct” and rewarded when touched. The cue was
a gray square (2.5 cm) presented in one of three different possible
light intensities. Top and bottom position were separated by a gap
of 2.0 cm from the boundaries of the squares. Only touches on the
touch field lead to supply of a reward. Each session included 40 tri-
als or was terminated after 60min. The criterion to progress into
the next phase was performing 40 trials per day on two consecu-
tive days. In 50% of all trials the position of the cue did not change
between two consecutive trials (“ongoing” condition), while it
changed between the trials in the other 50% (“switch” condi-
tion). Touches on the non-reward-indicating touch field and the
cue presentation field did not result in any reaction of the system.
During the “CUE-POSITION TASK WITH CORRECTION”-phase
touches on the non-reward-indicating touch field were counted
“incorrect” and lead to a 5 s timeout with house light illumination
and initiation of a correction trial, which was counted separately
and repeated until the animal responded correctly. Each session
consisted of 40 trials (not including correction trials) with equal
occurrence probabilities for “ongoing” and “switch” conditions.
The session was either finished after the completion of 40 trials
or a training time of 60min. The criterion to progress into the
next phase was performance of 40 trials with at least 80% correct
responses on two consecutive days.
In the last training phase “CUE-POSITION TASK WITH DIS-
TRACTOR AND CORRECTION,” the “distractor switch” con-
dition was introduced. As in the “switch” condition the
reward-indicating cue occurred in different positions on two
consecutive trials, but was additionally accompanied by the pre-
sentation of a distracting cue in the second trial (Figure 4). The
distracting cue (= distractor) occurred in form of a second gray
square on the cue presentation field and was presented simul-
taneously to the reward-indicating cue. Similar to the reward-
indicating cue the distractor was presented in three different
gray intensities, all darker than the reward-indicating cue and for
answering correctly, the mouse needed to solve the task accord-
ing to the brighter cue. Combination of brightness intensities
of the two cues consistently equaled the same mean brightness.
“Ongoing,” “switch,” and “distractor switch” conditions were pre-
sented with occurrence probabilities of 50, 25, and 25%, respec-
tively. Incorrect touches (touches according to the distractor) led
to a 5 s timeout with house light illumination, followed by cor-
rection trials. Initially, the animals had to perform 40 trials a
day which was subsequently raised to 50 trials. In both phases
the learning criterion was set to 80% correct responses on two
consecutive days.
Testing. Once a mouse had successfully reached the final learn-
ing criterion, it was tested in the translational stability/flexibility
(STABFLEX) test on 14 consecutive days. A testing day consisted
of 50 trials per day and mouse, yielding a total amount of 700 tri-
als per animal. A single session ended after the performance of 50
trials or 60min elapsed time. In contrast to the training phase,
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FIGURE 4 | Task conditions. The STABFLEX test combines five different
task conditions, including ongoing, switch, distractor ongoing, distractor
switch, and ambiguous conditions. Different conditions are defined by
the number of cues presented in the cue presentation field (one or
two), their position (top or bottom), their relative intensity (different gray
values), and the foregoing trial (middle column colored in light gray).
Top row: While an ongoing trial is characterized by the presentation of
only one cue in the same position in two consecutive trials (left), a
switch condition describes a change in the position of the cue between
the trials (here: cue at the top > cue at the bottom, right). Middle
row: The distractor conditions, i.e., distractor ongoing (left) and
distractor switch (right), are based on the same principle, but are
complemented by a second cue of different intensity that is task
irrelevant and thus a distractor that renders the task more difficult. For
answering correctly, the animal needs to solve the task according to
the brighter cue. Bottom row: Finally, animals are presented with
ambiguous situations that are characterized by the presentation of two
cues of the same intensity. The classification of these trials as
ambiguous/non-switch (left) vs. ambiguous/switch (right) depends on the
behavior of the animal and this condition does not favor one of the
two response alternatives. Conditions are presented as a series of two
consecutive trials, starting with the foregoing trial in the middle column
of the illustration and choices are depicted by the position of the
mouse in front of the screen.
testing did not contain any correction trials, while incorrect
responses were still punished with house light illumination and
5 s timeout. For all testing days, we used pseudo-randomized
sequences with no more than three consecutive “ongoing” trials.
Between the “ongoing” conditions one out of four possible other
conditions were presented. All conditions, namely “switch,” “dis-
tractor switch,” “distractor ongoing,” and “ambiguous” (Figure 4)
had the same probability to appear (probability of condition
appearance: 66% ongoing, 8.5% each switch, distractor switch,
distractor ongoing and ambiguous). While “switch” and “distrac-
tor switch” conditions were introduced in the training, the “dis-
tractor ongoing” and “ambiguous” conditions were completely
new to the mice in the testing procedure (Figure 3).
In the “distractor ongoing” condition a distractor of another
gray intensity was presented simultaneously to the brighter
reward-indicating cue on the cue presentation field (Figure 4;
middle row). As in the “distractor switch” condition, the subject
was required to follow the lighter cue and answer according to the
“ongoing” condition. In the “ambiguous” condition two squares
with identical gray intensity were presented on the cue presen-
tation field (Figure 4; lower row). In this condition, the task did
thus not unambiguously indicate a rewarded and a non-rewarded
side, so that the animal could freely choose between the two pos-
sible responses. In any case, however, the choice was followed by
a reward.
Behavioral measures
While in the training phase the number of trials required to attain
criterion performance in the different training phases was of
major interest for the analysis, performance in the STABFLEX test
was assessed using the following behavioral measures: (i) num-
ber of errors [error rates (ER)], (ii) average choice latencies or
response times for correct responses (RT), which were measured
as the time from the onset of the cue presentation until the mouse
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made a nose-poke response; and (iii) response time costs, which
refer to the difference between the RTs of any condition and the
baseline condition (“ongoing”). In addition, two further behav-
ioral measures were calculated, the “distractor resistance” and the
“individual spontaneous switching score,” to analyze the data as
analogously as possible to the human condition.
First, a so-called “distractor resistance” was calculated with
the aim of describing an animal’s ability to maintain a behav-
ior in the face of potential distractors. As more stable subjects
are expected to be more resistant to distraction (Durstewitz and
Seamans, 2008; Armbruster et al., 2012), the measure was based
on correct and incorrect choices made in the “distractor ongoing
condition.” More precisely, distractor resistance was calculated as
a choice score (correct choices—incorrect choices) corrected for
the overall individual performance in the “ongoing” condition. By
including the correction for the overall success rate under baseline
conditions (“ongoing”) in the formula, inter-individual differ-
ences in learning abilities were taken into account. On a scale from
−1 (very distractible) to +1 (resistant to distraction) this score
describes an individual’s ability to resist distraction.
distractor resistance
= Ndistractor (correct) − Ndistractor (incorrect)
Ndistractor (correct + incorrect choices)
÷ success rateongoing
According to the human test version (Armbruster et al., 2012), the
probability of spontaneously switching under ambiguous con-
ditions without external cues was also assessed. This so-called
“individual spontaneous switching score” (ISSS) was calculated
on the basis of switches and non-switches in the “ambiguous”
condition:
ISSS = Nambiguous (switches) − Nambiguous(nonswitches)
Nambiguous (switches + nonswitches)
Only responses which followed a correct response in the preced-
ing “ongoing” condition were included in this analysis. Similar
to the “individual spontaneous switching rate” in the human
paradigm, this measure reflects the tendency of an animal to
either continue responding with the same behavioral response
(stability) or to switch between the responses and exhibit more
flexible characteristics. On a scale from −1 (very stable) to +1
(very flexible) this score thus describes an individual’s tendency
to behave in a stable or flexible way.
DATA ANALYSIS
Behavioral log files of the conducted experiments contained full
information on the course of the experiments. Each trial was rep-
resented by a matrix row containing the experimental condition,
the response given and the response time. This data was reduced
by averaging the latencies over specific condition× decision com-
binations and by counting the numbers of specific responses as a
function of experimental condition and in case of the ISSS also as
a function of the condition and response in the preceding trial
(see Behavioral Measures). These calculations were performed
using custom MATLAB routines.
Latencymeasures and ER of 22mice were then entered into the
statistical analysis presented below. Latencies were determined by
averaging all response times of one condition across all correct tri-
als of this mouse, while errors were summed up per condition and
related to the amount of trials per condition to determine individ-
ual ER. For inferential statistics, repeated measures ANOVAs were
applied to investigate the effects of “condition.” on response times
and ER. When necessary, post-hoc tests were performed using a
Bonferroni correction. To test the predictions made by the Dual
State Theory, correlation analyses were conducted using Pearson’s
product-moment correlation coefficient (r) and Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient (rs). All statistical tests were conducted
using the software package SPSS (version 19.0 for Windows), and
differences were considered to be significant at p ≤ 0.05.
RESULTS
HABITUATION AND TRAINING
Of the 24 mice that were used for the establishment of the
STABFLEX test, 22 individuals were entered into the following
analyses. The exclusion of two animals was based on either bad
or inconsistent performance in the cue position task or in the
testing phase. Thus, one subject was excluded from the analysis,
because its overall success rate did not exceed chance level in the
cue-position task, although it was trained for 86 days. The second
animal succeeded to go through the various training phases, but
stopped behaving in an active way after a few days in the testing
phase. Because the subject did not show any behavioral abnor-
malities in the home cage and we could not observe any signs of
disease, we considered this behavior to have a motivational cause
and excluded the animal due to a lack of data.
During the initial phase of the task (habituation) animals were
habituated to the touchscreen-box and required to learn how to
initiate trials and to touch on the screen for getting a reward.
On average, mice needed 15 days to go through these basic steps
with only two animals that needed more than 20 days to reach
the criterion (Table 1). The subsequent training phase consisted
of five different sub-phases that were completed after 63 ± 4
days. Notably, the overall training duration ranged from 29 to 90
days, reflecting considerable inter-individual variability (Table 1).
Differences in training duration, however, were mainly due to
performance differences in the cue-position task with correction.
While one mouse reached the criterion already after 15 days,
another one required 79 days to go through this critical training
phase (Table 1). In this context, the number of correction trials
per day turned out to be a good measure for the assessment of an
individual’s learning progress throughout this phase (Figure 5).
While some individuals were characterized by a rapid decrease
of correction trials (Figure 5A), the performance of other indi-
viduals followed a more gradual improvement over several days
(Figure 5C). Thus, although some animals required more than 2
months learning the cue-position task with correction, their perfor-
mance was characterized by a continuously decreasing number of
correction trials.
Furthermore, we were interested in the question whether a
“good performer” in the training phase remains a “good per-
former” in the test phase. We therefore correlated the number of
days needed to go through the cue-position task with correction
in the training with the overall success rate in the testing phase.
Indeed, we found a significant negative correlation between
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Table 1 | Duration of habituation and training phases in days.
Habituation Training (cue-position task with correction)
Mean 15 63 (47)
s.e.m 1 4 (4)
Min. 12 29 (15)
Max. 25 90 (79)
Subjects had to reach specific learning criteria to enter the next phase.
Accordingly, habituation and training durations differed widely between the
individuals, n = 22.
FIGURE 5 | Number of correction trials during the cue-position task
with correction of three individual mice. The total number of correction
trials turned out to be a good measure for an individual’s learning progress
in this phase. Different types of learning curves were observed: While
some subjects were characterized by a rapid decrease of correction trials,
reflecting a steep learning progress (A), others were characterized by a
more gradual learning improvement over time (B,C).
the duration of this training phase and the later success rate:
The faster an animal reached the learning criterion in the cue-
position task with correction, the better it was in the testing phase
(r = −0.493, p = 0.020; rs = −0.459, p = 0.031).
TESTING COGNITIVE FLEXIBILITY VS. COGNITIVE STABILITY
Testing was successfully done with 50 trials per day on 14 suc-
cessive days in all mice, yielding a total amount of 700 trials per
animal. Although animals were not required to reach a specific
learning criterion during the testing phase, the overall success
rates were similar to those of the final training phase, indicat-
ing robust performances over time. With a mean of 79.3% the
overall success rate (= correct choices/700) ranged from 67.5 to
89.1% (Table 2). Except of one animal that did not reach the 70%
mark, mice solved the task correctly in at least 75% of all trials,
demonstrating constantly good performance abilities also during
the testing phase. In addition to the overall success rate, behav-
ioral performance in the testing phase was separately analyzed for
each condition (“ongoing,” “switch,” “distractor ongoing,” “dis-
tractor switch,” “ambiguous”) using both response times and ER.
Concerning the response times, only minimal differences were
observed between the five testing conditions, ranging from a
mean latency of 1.9 s in the “distractor ongoing” condition to
2.1 s in the “ambiguous” condition (Table 3). Accordingly, the
observed differences between response times of the specific event
conditions and the “ongoing” condition did not exceed± 130ms.
Notably, we observed negative response time costs in the distrac-
tor conditions, indicating that on average it took the mice slightly
longer to respond to the “ongoing” than to the “distractor ongo-
ing” and the “distractor switch” conditions (Table 3). By contrast,
ER clearly differed between the conditions in the expected way,
with only 18.6% in the “ongoing” condition and 28.8% in the
“distractor switch” condition, probably reflecting an increasing
degree of difficulty (Figure 6).
Subsequent inferential statistics, using repeated measures
ANOVAs, revealed significant effects of the condition on both
response times [F(4, 84) = 2.775, p = 0.032] and ER [F(3, 63) =
12.267, p < 0.001]. Further Bonferroni corrected post-hoc-
analyses of the response times, however, showed that differences
were only approaching significance and restricted to the compar-
ison of the “ambiguous” condition with the “distractor ongoing”
condition (p = 0.06), while all other conditions did not differ
significantly. With respect to the ER, a significant difference was
found between the “ongoing” and “distractor switch” condition
(p < 0.001, Figure 6), while there were no statistically significant
differences between “ongoing,” and “switch” and “ongoing,” and
“distractor ongoing” conditions (p > 0.1). Furthermore, ER of
the “distractor switch” condition were higher than those of the
“switch” condition (p < 0.001) and those of the “distractor ongo-
ing” condition (p = 0.034, Figure 6). A difference between ER
of the “switch” and the “distractor ongoing” conditions was not
observed (p > 0.1).
To test some behavioral predictions derived from the Dual
State Theory, two further behavioral measures were investigated:
The ISSS and the distractor resistance (see Animals, Materials,
and Methods). While the ISSS aims to capture the individual
level of flexibility/stability in the “ambiguous” condition on a
scale from −1 (extremely stable) to +1 (extremely flexible), the
distractor resistance was calculated on the basis of correct and
incorrect choices in the “distractor ongoing” condition and as
such reflects an individual’s ability to solve a task correctly in
face of distracting stimuli (the higher the value, the more sta-
ble the individual, see Animals, Materials, and Methods). Both
measures were found to vary substantially between individuals,
indicating different degrees of cognitive flexibility and stability
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Table 2 | Summary of main behavioral measures.
Success Individual spontaneous Distractor
rate (%) switching score resistance
Mean 79.3 −0.057 0.698
s.e.m 1.0 0.041 0.037
Min. 67.5 −0.302 0.293
Max. 89.1 0.349 0.944
On the basis of correct and incorrect choices in five different test conditions,
three main behavioral parameters were calculated: overall success rate (cor-
rect choices independent of the specific task condition), individual spontaneous
switching score, and distractor resistance, n = 22.
Table 3 | Descriptive statistics for response times (RT), and response
time costs.
Response times (ms) Costs (ms)
Mean ± s.e.m. Mean ± s.e.m.
Ongoing 2055±116
Switch 2057±121 2±58
Distractor ongoing 1926±97 −130±61
Distractor switch 2022±118 −33±46
Ambiguous 2104±118 49±50
While the absolute response times capture mean latency values per condition,
the costs are corrected by the time needed to finish an ongoing trial (e.g., RT
switch − RT ongoing = Switching costs). Data are separately presented for each
test condition and presented as means ± standard error of the mean, n = 22.
in our sample (Table 2). Similar to the previous human study,
the ISSS thus allowed for identifying more stable (<0) and
more flexible (>0) subjects. Furthermore, we observed suffi-
cient variability in the ISSS to conduct individual differences
analyses.
In the human paradigm, the individual spontaneous switch-
ing rate was negatively correlated with the switching costs
(Armbruster et al., 2012), assuming that this rate is not merely
a reflection of a perceptual bias but that it indeed reflects a behav-
ioral tendency toward more flexible behavior. Translating the test
to the mouse condition led to a similar observation: Here, cor-
relation analyses also revealed a significant negative correlation
between the ISSS and the switching costs (r = −0.480, p = 0.012;
rs = −0.364, p = 0.048). Thus, the higher the ISSS and, thus,
the more flexible the subject behaved in the “ambiguous” con-
dition, the less “costly” it was for the subject to switch between
the answers in non-ambiguous conditions when instructed to do
so (Figure 7). According to further behavioral predictions, one
should also expect a correlation between the ISSS and the error
rate of the “switch” condition. Indeed, such a correlation was
found with more flexible subjects making less switching errors
under non-ambiguous conditions (Pearson product-moment
correlation coefficient, r = −0.471, p = 0.0013; Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient, rs = −0.524, p = 0.006, Figure 8), even
after the exclusion of one animal with an exclusively high error
rate of 44.6% in the “switch” condition (r = −0.455, p = 0.019;
FIGURE 6 | Error rates in the STABFLEX test. The error rates were
calculated on the basis of the number of incorrect touches divided by the
total number of trials per condition. Conditions were compared using a
repeated measures ANOVA with “condition” as within-subjects factor and
subsequent Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc analyses. Data are presented
separately for the four experimental conditions as means ± standard error
of the mean. ∗p ≤ 0.05.
rs = −0.483, p = 0.013). However, no similar correlations were
found between the ISSS and the ER of the “distractor switch”
condition (p > 0.1). For distractor inhibition, the results were
also in the expected direction, but less robust: Using Spearman’s
rank correlation coefficient, a trend toward a negative correlation
between ISSS and distractor resistance was detected (rs = −0.342,
p = 0.06, Figure 9) that could, however, not be confirmed using
Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient (r = −0.237,
p = 0.144).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we introduce a novel task paradigm to
assess cognitive flexibility vs. cognitive stability in mice. Inspired
by neurocomputational modeling of the pFC-DA network, the
task was originally established in a healthy human population
(Armbruster et al., 2012), before being translated back to preclin-
ical conditions in the present study.
Our aims were, first, to translate the procedure as analo-
gously as possible from the human to the mouse, while at the
same time accounting for species-specific demands, and, second,
to test core behavioral predictions derived from the Dual State
Theory (Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008) in a murine wildtype
population, namely whether cognitive flexibility and stability are
antagonistically related in individual subjects.
TRANSLATING COGNITIVE MEASURES: THE STABFLEX PROCEDURE
Translating tests of human executive functions still is a chal-
lenge (Tecott and Nestler, 2004). However, by providing vir-
tually unlimited possibilities for task development, touchscreen
approaches extend the repertoire for testing cognitive func-
tions in animals like no other methodology (Bussey et al.,
2012; Dickson et al., 2013; Horner et al., 2013; Mar et al.,
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FIGURE 7 | Correlation between switching costs and the individual
spontaneous switching rate. Switching costs were calculated by
subtracting response times of the ongoing condition from those of the
switch condition. According to the predictions of the Dual State Theory,
switching costs and the individual spontaneous switching score were
negatively correlated: The more flexible the subject, the lower the
switching costs in the switch condition. The correlation was calculated
using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.
FIGURE 8 | Correlation between the error rate for switching and the
individual spontaneous switching rate. According to the predictions of
the Dual State Theory, the error rate of the switch condition and the
individual spontaneous switching score were negatively correlated: The
more flexible the subject, the less errors it made in the switch condition.
The correlation was calculated using Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient.
2013; Oomen et al., 2013; Silverman et al., 2013; Talpos
and Steckler, 2013). We carefully aimed to avoid confound-
ing variables: Thus, the procedure is highly automated, avoids
experimenter bias, and involves little stress for the animal
(Chesler et al., 2002; Wahlsten et al., 2003; De Visser et al.,
FIGURE 9 | Correlation between distractor resistance and the
individual spontaneous switching rate. According to the predictions
of the Dual State Theory, the distractor resistance and the individual
spontaneous switching score were negatively correlated: The more
flexible the subjects, the less resistant to distractors they were. The
correlation was calculated using Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient.
2006; Bussey et al., 2012; Strickland and Mercier, 2014).
Moreover, all subjects were handled gently without physi-
cal restraint to reduce anxiety and stress (Hurst and West,
2010).
The cognitive task we established resembled the human ver-
sion as closely as possible. As in the human paradigm, cues solely
rely on visual input, which seems to be in contrast to rodents’ low
reliance on vision but can also be regarded as the strength of the
system: By forcing the animals to solve problems in a “human-
like” way, the approach has excellent face validity and prevents
the experimental subjects from using secondary cues that we are
unaware of (Talpos and Steckler, 2013).
Behavioral differences were assessed using response times
and ER as it was done in the human study (Armbruster
et al., 2012). By providing direct animal homologs of clin-
ically important measures in human research, we aimed for
high construct and predictive validity (Garner et al., 2006,
2011; Gould and Gottesman, 2006; Talpos and Steckler, 2013).
Our test systematically investigated two cognitive domains,
i.e., cognitive flexibility and cognitive stability, under the
same conditions and using the same apparatus, thus com-
pleting the “wish-list” for an ideal cognitive testing method
(Bussey et al., 2012).
However, there are also slight differences between the human
and the animal paradigm, the most important being that while
the switch condition of the human paradigm always involved
the simultaneous presentation of a distracting cue, the mouse
paradigm also involved trials with switching cues without the
simultaneous presentation of a distracting cue. This was imple-
mented to reduce complexity and adapt for the cognitive capaci-
ties of the mice (see below).
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THE DICHOTOMY OF COGNITIVE FLEXIBILITY AND COGNITIVE
STABILITY
While behavioral differences between the task conditions could
easily be detected on the basis of latency measures in the
human paradigm, response time measurements were not sensi-
tive enough to describe differences in the murine task version.
Thus, average response times were two- to three-fold bigger in
mice than in men, but varied less in mice. Probably, this discrep-
ancy can be explained by the higher motoric component involved
in the touching response. Humans were able to respond to the
different task conditions by pressing a button within hundreds
of milliseconds, while mice had to initiate the trial at the back
of the chamber, then turning around, comparing the cues on the
screen, before responding to the task by moving forward to either
the left or the right cross. The high visual-motoric requirements
may therefore overlap with the cognitive operations, challenging
the use of response times in this context. This adds to previous
discussions about the use of latency measures in cognitive testing
(Richter et al., 2012).
ER, on the other hand, were very low and showed little vari-
ation in humans, but were well-suited to reflect the cognitive
demands in mice. Although overall ER were much higher in
mice than in men, similar differences between the conditions
could be detected in both species. ER were found to increase
from the “ongoing” to the “switch” and “distractor ongoing” con-
ditions. This is in line with the findings of the human study
reporting longer response times for task switching (= “distractor
switch” in the murine study) than for distractor resistance= “dis-
tractor ongoing” in the murine study; Armbruster et al.(2012).
Moreover, the data argue for the antagonistic model of cognitive
flexibility and stability: Subjects with a higher ISSS were char-
acterized by lower switching costs in the unambiguous “switch”
condition. A similar correlation was found in the human task
(Armbruster et al., 2012), validating the newly introduced mea-
sure of switching in an ambiguous condition (i.e., the ISSS) for
mice. Furthermore, there was a significant correlation between
the switching score and the error rate in the “switch” condi-
tion, indicating that more flexible subjects were able to switch
more efficiently. In the “distractor switch” condition however, ER
were highest and there was no correlation to the switching score,
indicating that this task may be too complex for mice and thus
is not suited to describing a mouse’s disposition toward more
flexible or stable behavior. We therefore believe that the mice’s
behavioral responses in the simple “switch” condition without
distractor more adequately mimic what has been observed in the
more complex human switch condition.
Finally, as more flexible mice also tended to be more
distractible in the “distractor ongoing” condition, our results
confirm the hypotheses that subjects switching more often spon-
taneously are more distractible to secondary cues, but also more
flexible in situations, where cognitive flexibility is required. This
is in line with previous findings on humans, showing that higher
distractibility occurred in more flexible persons (Dreisbach and
Goschke, 2004; Dreisbach et al., 2005; Tharp and Pickering,
2011; Armbruster et al., 2012; Zhang and Chan, 2013) and sup-
ports the predictions made by the Dual State Theory (Durstewitz
and Seamans, 2008). Accordingly, the present study provides
additional behavioral support from a different species for two
crucial assumptions of the Dual State Theory, i.e., that individu-
als differ in their degree of cognitive flexibility and that cognitive
flexibility and stability are antagonistically related—supposedly
controlled by a common prefrontal neural mechanism involving
differential effects of D1 and D2 receptor activation (Floresco and
Phillips, 2001; Floresco and Magyar, 2006; Floresco et al., 2006;
Vijayraghavan et al., 2007).
To validate the paradigm and to investigate the involvement
of a pFC-DA network in the control of these higher execu-
tive functions, future studies are necessary, either working with
dopamine-agonists/antagonists or with genetically modified mice
to experimentally shift behavior toward a more stable or flexible
pattern. In light of clinical research, this may contribute to a better
understanding of cognitive dysfunctions in psychiatric diseases
like schizophrenia and may even offer new routes for developing
efficient pharmacological treatments in the long term.
CONCLUSIONS
Here, we report the successful modification of a human neuropsy-
chological task for use with mice. The results of this study support
a dichotomy of cognitive flexibility and cognitive stability and
thus confirm some fundamental predictions made by a biophysi-
cally realistic computational model of PFC function, i.e., theDual
State Theory. Similarities in behavioral patterns between humans
and mice indicate the translational potential of the testing proce-
dure and support the use of touchscreen procedures in preclinical
animal research. This may launch an exciting new generation of
behavioral tests for mice that promise to overcome many lim-
itations of current high-throughput testing, while at the same
time providing direct animal homologs of clinically promising
measures in human research.
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